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Ohio is an important part of this nation's economy, with approxi-
mately 5% of the nation's population. [Such a] substantial. . . part
of the economy certainly deserves thorough protection from re-
straints of trade. The General Assembly has provided that protec-
tion by embracing the fundamental economic policy of a free com-
petitive marketplace in the Valentine Act. In addition, Ohio has
distinguished itself as being a leading state in aggressive antitrust
enforcement.'
Without question, there is a strong revival of the demand for
effective antitrust enforcement efforts at the state level. 2 The Federal
Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice, although very active in enforcing the federal antitrust laws,
are often prevented by resource limitations and the interstate com-
merce requirement from prosecuting regional or local restraints that
nevertheless harm the consumer and tamper with the free market
mechanism.3
This reawakening of the demand for effective antitrust enforce-
ment is not limited to the state level. The 94th Congress has, for
example, enacted legislation that permits state attorneys general to
sue in a parens patriae capacity on behalf of the citizens of the state,4
broadens the precomplaint discovery authority of the Antitrust Divi-
sion of the Department of Justice,5 and requires notification proce-
dures before a merger.' Congress has also authorized $30 million in
Assistant Attorney general, State of Ohio, Chief, Antitrust Section.
** Assistant Attorneys General, State of Ohio.
Testimony of James T. Halverson, Director, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade
Commission, Hearings on House Bill 600 Before the General Assembly of Ohio, House
Judiciary Comm., May 8, 1975, at 3 [hereinafter cited as HALVERSON'S TESTIMONY].
2 For example, the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) has actively
begun programs aimed at effective state antitrust enforcement. A review of weekly advance
sheets of ANTITRUST & TRADE REGULATION REPORT (BNA) and TRADE REGULATION
REPORTER (CCH) indicates a substantial increase in state antitrust cases over the past several
years.
3 See HALVERSON'S TESTIMONY, supra note 1. at 2.
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 301
(SEPTEMBER 30, 1976). See text accompanying notes 140-43 infra.
Id. § 101.
I Id. § 201.
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federal aid to state antitrust enforcement agencies. 7 This strong inter-
est in providing a healthy free-market atmosphere is also evidenced
by the ease with which state fair trade laws, and the federal antitrust
exemption that permitted these laws, were repealed.'
The Ohio General Assembly has specifically authorized by
statute9 the creation of an Antitrust Section within the Attorney
General's Office to represent the state and its agencies in enforcing
both federal and state antitrust laws. In addition, the legislature has
provided that the Antitrust Section can, by agreement, represent
political subdivisions of the state in antitrust matters.10 Each year
since 1967 the Office of the Ohio Attorney General has become more
active in enforcing the antitrust laws, in the hope that an effective
antitrust enforcement program at both the federal and state levels will
have a deterrent effect upon future potential violators, and will thus
maintain a competitive marketplace.
Although the Office of the Attorney General does file suits on
behalf of the state and its agencies under the federal antitrust laws
when the state or its agencies have been damaged," this article will
provide an overall view of how Ohio's antitrust laws are enforced,
what types of violations are covered by these laws, and what may be
expected in state antitrust enforcement activities in the future.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS
A. Early Federal and State Legislation
One of the leading proponents of federal antitrust legislation was
Senator John Sherman of Ohio, whose efforts resulted in the enact-
ment on July 2, 1890, of "An Act to Protect Trade and Commerce
Against Unlawful Restraints and Monopolies," commonly known as
the Sherman Act. 2 During the debates of Senator Sherman's bill, the
Senator described the dangerous characteristics of a trust and urged
passage of the bill to protect the public from the evils which followed
the elimination of competition:
The sole object of such a combination is to make competition
impossible. It can control the market, raise or lower prices, as will
best promote its selfish interests, reduce prices in a particular local-
ity and break down competition and advance prices at will where
Pub. L. No. 94-503, § 116 (October 15, 1976).
See text accompanying notes 129-39 infra.
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 109.82 (Page 1969).
" Id. § 109.81.
El Pursuant to § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (Supp. IV, 1974).
12 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (Supp. IV, 1974).
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competition does not exist. Its governing motive is to increase the
profits of the parties composing it. The law of selfishness, uncon-
trolled by competition, compels it to disregard the interest of the
consumer. . . .[I]t tends to advance the price to the consumer of
any article produced, it is a substantial monopoly injurious to the
public, . . . and the just subject of restraint by the courts . . .13
Although the scope of the Sherman Act is quite broad, a number
of states, including Ohio, have sought to complement the federal
antitrust laws by passing their own antitrust statutes. The Ohio law,
commonly known as the Valentine Act, was passed in 1898.11 Unlike
the Sherman Act, the Valentine Act includes a detailed definition of
a trust, and declares that a trust is "unlawful and void."' 5 The defini-
tion includes a broad prohibition against conduct which restricts
trade or commerce,"6 a provision also found in the Sherman Act. Also
prohibited are combinations that limit or reduce production or
increase or reduce the price of a commodity, 17 or that "prevent com-
petition in manufacturing, making, transportation, sale, or purchase
of merchandise, produce or a commodity.""6 In addition to these
rather general provisions, the Ohio legislators, obviously concerned
about the effects which trusts would have upon prices, specifically
outlawed the fixing of prices to the public or the consumer, 9 and
prohibited persons from entering into contracts or agreements relat-
ing to the price of a commodity that would have the effect of pre-
cluding "free and unrestricted competition among themselves, pur-
chasers, or consumers in the sale or transportation of such article or
commodity . "...20
B. The Rule of Reason Test and the Per Se Rule in Ohio
1. The Sherman Act
After an initial period of indecision the United States Supreme
Court determined that section 1 of the Sherman Act 2' applies only
to unreasonable restraints of trade.22 This "rule of reason" test in-
'0 21 CONG. REc. 2459 (1890), See 1 H. TOULMIN, ANTI-TRUST LAWS § 1.9, at 10 (1949).
1 Act of April 19, 1898, 93 Ohio Laws 143 (codified at O-o REV. CODE ANN. Ch. 1331
(Page 1962)).
" OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.01 (Page 1962).
1" Id. § 1331.01(B)(I).
17 Id. § 1331.01(B)(2).
" Id. § 1331.01(B)(3).
I d. § 1331.01(B)(4).
Id. § 1331.01(B)(5).
22 See note 43 infra for the broad provision.
2 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affd, 175 U.S.
211 (1899); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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volves a determination of the purpose of the agreement in question,
the power of the parties to carry out the agreement, and the effect of
the agreement on competition.2 The peculiar facts of each case and
each business situation must be examined; restraints that merely reg-
ulate and thereby possibly promote competition, as opposed to re-
straints that may suppress and even destroy competition, may not be
violations.24
Soon after the rule of reason test was firmly established, the
United States Supreme Court began developing the per se doctrine
which singled out certain restraints as unreasonable by their very
nature. The Court succinctly explained in Northern Pacific Railway
Co. v. United States that
there are certain agreements or practices which because of their
pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue
are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal
without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused
or the business excuse for their use.
The Court has stressed two advantages in using a per se doctrine to
classify certain activities as conclusively illegal- simplicity and cer-
tainty of application.
Professor von Kalinowski has identified three major areas to
which the courts look in determining whether a class of restraints
should be termed illegal per se: the economic effect of the restraint
in the past, the anticompetitive evil that is feared, and the beneficial
purposes served by the restraint.2 1 If the answers to these inquiries
reveal that the type of restraint studied has had a pernicious effect
on competition that is not balanced by any beneficial effects, then
that class of restraints will be termed illegal per se. The Court will
not permit further inquiry either in that case or in succeeding cases
to determine whether the restraint in question is reasonable.,,
The following have been found to be illegal per se: price fixing (hori-
zontal and vertical),2 tying arrangements, 2 boycotts (horizontal and
23 See generally I J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 6.02
(1975).
24 See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
-s 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
216 See I J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 23, § 6.02(1)(b).
27 Id.
21 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Tren-
ton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (horizontal); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park &
Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (vertical).
" Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969); lnternat'l
Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, appeal dismissed, 332 U.S. 747 (1947).
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vertical), 0 division of markets (horizontal and vertical), 31 and recip-
rocal dealings.32
2. The Valentine Act
The first difficulty in analyzing the body of cases interpreting the
Valentine Act is that none have been decided by the Ohio Supreme
Court since 1941,3 and only ten supreme court opinions were re-
ported prior to that date.34 Similarly, there were only seven court of
appeals decisions reported between 1918 and 1961. 31 A review of the
Ohio cases, however, indicates that the courts have generally taken a
rule of reason approach. The Ohio Supreme Court in List v. Burley
Tobacco Growers' Co-operative Association 6 stated that
we are compelled to recognize the condition as it exists, to wit, that
the federal courts are now construing the Sherman Act according
to the rule of reason. If the United States Supreme Court felt justi-
fied in modifying its former decisions interpreting the Sherman Act,
then it would seem that the Supreme Court of Ohio might properly
at this late date place the same interpretation upon the state enact-
ment which the federal courts have found expedient to place upon
the federal enactment.37
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators'
Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
11 United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (horizontal); United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (vertical).
'2 United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D. N.Y. 1966).
3 Rayess v. Lane Drug Co., 138 Ohio St. 401, 35 N.E.2d 447 (1941).
31 Id; Stark County Milk Producers' Ass'n v. Tabeling, 129 Ohio St. 159, 194 N.E. 60
(1934); Early v. Co-operative Pure Milk Ass'n, 115 Ohio St. 185, 152 N.E. 290 (1926): List v.
Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-operative Ass'n, 114 Ohio St. 361, 151 N.E. 471 (1926); Colum-
bus Packing Co. v. State ex rel. Schlesinger, 106 Ohio St. 469, 140 N.E. 376 (1922); Guyton
v. Eastern Elec. Co., 91 Ohio St. 106, 110 N.E. 189 (1914); Lemmon v. State, 77 Ohio St.
427, 83 N.E. 608 (1908); Hammond v. State, 78 Ohio St. 15, 84 N.E. 416 (1908); State v. Gage,
72 Ohio St. 210, 73 N.E. 1078 (1905); State ex rel. Monnett v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 61 Ohio
St. 520, 56 N.E. 464 (1900).
u Broadway Properties v. Crouch, 114 Ohio App. 30, 180 N.E.2d 162 (1961); Daily
Monument Co. v. Crown Hill Cemetery Ass'n, 114 Ohio App. 143, 176 N.E.2d 268 (1961);
Orth v. Lauther, 95 Ohio App. 394, 120 N.E.2d 313 (1953); Oliver v. All-States Freight, 156
N.E.2d 190 (1957), appeal dismissed, 167 Ohio St. 299, 147 N.E.2d 856 (1958), rev'd, 358 U.S.
283 (1959); Superior Dairy, Inc. v. Stark Cty. Milk Producers' Ass'n, 89 Ohio App. 26, 100
N.E.2d 695 (1950); H. Lipman & Sons, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Painters, 63 Ohio App. 157, 25
N.E.2d 853 (1939); Clover Meadow Creamery Co. v. National Dairy Products Co., 17 Ohio
L. Abs. 231 (1934).
36 114 Ohio St. 361, 151 N.E. 471 (1925).
3 114 Ohio St. at 374, 151 N.E. at 475. See also Stark County Milk Producers' Ass'n v.
Tabeling, 129 Ohio St. 159, 194 N.E. 16 (1934); Columbus Packing Co. v. State ex rel.
Schlesinger, 106 Ohio St. 469, 140 N.E. 376 (1922).
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The lower courts have generally taken a similar approach." It is thus
evident from the cases that the rule of reason test has been adopted
in Ohio.
The most recently reported Valentine Act decision of the Ohio
Supreme Court was the 1941 case of Rayess v. Lane Drug Co.,3"
which involved an agreement between substantially all cigarette job-
bers and retailers in Ohio to fix the retail price of substantially all
brands of cigarettes sold within the state. The court cited language
from the Valentine Act" indicating that the agreement came within
the prohibitions of the Act and was therefore void, basing its decision
on the factual conclusion that this was, in effect, a horizontal agree-
ment to fix prices. It then cited as authority several state cases41 and
United States v. Socony- Vacuum Oil Co.,4" one of the leading Sher-
man Act cases on the application of the per se doctrine to price fixing.
It is clear from the Rayess case that the court applied the per se
doctrine to price fixing. It is less clear whether the per se doctrine
applies to the other classes of restraints held to be per se illegal under
the Sherman Act. However, a comparison of the state and federal
laws is revealing. In enacting the Ohio antitrust law, the legislature
included a broad prohibition against restraints of trade very similar
to that included by Congress in section 1 of the Sherman Act.13 The
Ohio legislature went further than Congress, however, by enumerat-
ing specific agreements and practices which would be illegal under the
Valentine Act." The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that the
Valentine Act was patterned after the Sherman Act, but that the
Valentine Act had "broader and stronger terms." 5 Thus it appears
that agreements and conduct specified in the Act are likely to be
interpreted by the courts as per se illegal. The Ohio courts have taken
this approach on several occasions, primarily in price-fixing cases."
u See, e.g., Broadway Properties, Inc. v. Crouch, 114 Ohio App. 30, 180 N.E.2d 162
(1961); Daily Monument Co. v. Crown Hill Cemetery Ass'n, 114 Ohio App. 143, 176 N.E.2d
268 (1961); Orth v. Lauther, 95 Ohio App. 394, 120 N.E.2d 313 (1953); H. Lipman & Sons,
Inc. v. Brotherhood of Painters, 63 Ohio App. 157, 25 N.E.2d 853 (1939).
3' 138 Ohio St. 401, 35 N.E.2d 447 (1941).
420O4O REv. CODE ANN. § 1331.01(B)(5) (Page 1962).
" 138 Ohio St. at 407, 35 N.E.2d at 450.
42 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
0 Orno REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.01(B)(1) (Page 1962) prohibits combinations "to create
or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce." Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § I
(Supp. IV, 1974), prohibits contracts, combinations, or conspiracies "in restraint of trade or
commerce. ...."
" OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1331.01 (B)(2)-(B)(5) (Page 1961). See text accompanying
notes 17-20 supra.
42 List v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-operative Ass'n, 114 Ohio St. 361, 369, 151 N.E.
471, 474 (1926).
46 See, e.g., State ex rel. Cullitan v. Greater Cleveland Livery Owners Ass'n, 35 Ohio Op.
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Beyond these specific prohibitions, the Act's broad prohibition
of restraints of trade embraces the full range of Sherman Act provi-
sions. Ohio courts have recognized this and have consistently relied
upon continuing federal court interpretations of the Sherman Act as
persuasive precedent. 7 Thus restraints that are per se illegal under
federal antitrust laws will receive similar per se treatment under the
broad Ohio provision.
II. TYPES OF ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS
A. Price Fixing
In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Justice Douglas
described price fixing as "a combination formed for the purpose and
with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing
the price of a commodity. . . ."I' That definition has been expanded
by the Supreme Court to include combinations affecting the prices
of services as well.49 Although price fixing is not specifically pro-
scribed by the Sherman Act, the courts have consistently held such
conduct to be in violation of the Act.50
In Ohio, the Valentine Act includes a specific prohibition of
price fixing.5" As under the federal law, price-fixing agreements are
per se violations.52
An examination of the enforcement of both the federal and Ohio
antitrust laws reveals that, although there is a variety of methods by
which competition can be reduced or eliminated, price fixing is by far
the most common anticompetitive device.53 In examining price-
fixing cases brought by the Ohio Attorney General, one finds that
there was little or no activity in antitrust enforcement until the
1960's. Since 1967 the Ohio Office of the Attorney General has
68, 74 N.E.2d 104 (C.P. Cuyahoga Cty. 1947); McCall Co. v. O'Neil, 17 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 17
(C.P. Franklin Cty. 1914).
" See, e.g., Rayess v. Lane Drug Co., 138 Ohio St. 401, 35 N.E.2d 447 (1941); List v.
Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-operative Ass'n, 114 Ohio St. 361, 151 N.E. 471 (1926); State
ex rel. Monnett v. Buckeye Pipeline Co., 61 Ohio St. 520, 56 N.E. 464 (1900).
310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
" See United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950). See
generally I I J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 23, § 77.021 ] n.7.
I See cases cited note 28 supra; M. HANDLER, A STUDY OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS, S. Monograph No. 38, 76th Cong., 3d Sess.
10 (1941).
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.01(B)(2), (B)(4), (B)(5) (Page 1962).
52 State ex rel. Brown v. Andrew Palzes, Inc., 39 Ohio Misc. 155 (C.P. Cuyahoga Cty.
1973).
51 Remarks by William E. Swope, Atlanta Field Office, Antitrust Division, Department
of Justice, prepared for delivery at Federal-State Conference on Antitrust, April 11, 1973, at
4. See also E. KINTNER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER 30 (2d ed. 1973).
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brought actions pursuant to section 4 of the Clayton Act" for al-
leged price-fixing violations involving a wide variety of business
activities and commodities, including library editions of school-
books, brass mill tube and pipe, concrete pipe, chlorine, antibiotics,
plumbing fixtures, finish hardware, ready-mix concrete, automo-
biles, physician and prepaid health care services, chickens, and
bread. Price-fixing actions brought under the Valentine Act have
involved florists, shopping centers, engineers, architects, trade
books and mass-market paperbacks, and automobile dealers.
The above-mentioned cases for the most part involved alleged
"horizontal" price fixing, i.e. agreements by competitors at the same
distribution level, whether reached directly with one another or indi-
rectly through an association. Few cases have involved "vertical"
price fixing or resale price maintenance, by which a party at one level
of the distribution chain sets the price for those at a lower level of
the chain. This type of price fixing is particularly pertinent to present
antitrust enforcement because of the recent repeal of Ohio's so-called
fair trade law.55
B. Market Allocation
Another common device for eliminating competition is market
allocation. This practice consists of dividing the available business
according to a fixed percentage, a geographic territory, or by individ-
ual customer or type of customer. The result of such a restraint on
competition frequently is that output is limited, costs rise, and busi-
ness expansion is constricted."
, If market allocation is carried out by competitors or those per-
forming similar economic functions, it is considered a horizontal
agreement and is per se illegal under the broad interpretations of
sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act.57 Vertical market allocations
are agreements between parties who perform different economic
functions-e.g., a manufacturer and its dealers. The legal status of
these arrangements is less clear. In United States v. Arnold, Schwinn
& Co., the Supreme Court held that vertical territorial and customer
allocations are illegal per se if the manufacturer sells his product to
his distributors;58 however, if a consignment relationship exists be-
" 15 U.S.C. § 15 (Supp. IV, 1974).
5' See text accompanying notes 129-39 supra.
M. HANDLER, supra note 50, at 17.
" United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). See II J. VON
KALINOWSKI, supra note 23, § 78.01 (1976).
5 388 U.S. 365 (1967). See 8 J. VON KALINOSWKI, supra note 23, § 62.01 [2] (1976). Despite
Schwinn a number of lower courts have continued to rely on White Motor Co. v. United States,
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tween the manufacturer and dealers by which the manufacturer re-
tains "all indicia of ownership, including title, dominion, and risk,"
the rule of reason test applies.5' The Court has also held that an
allocation of markets may be horizontal in substance though vertical
in form. 0
The Valentine Act, like the Sherman Act, has no statutory provi-
sions that specifically deal with market allocations. However, the
general provisions prohibiting combinations restricting trade or com-
merce," preventing competition in the sale of merchandise, produce,
or a commodity" and outlawing agreements which restrict the manu-
facture or output of a commodity"s would be sufficient to reach this
practice."
Although there are few Ohio cases involving market allocations,
the recent case of State ex rel. Brown v. Andrew Palzes, Inc. 5 in-
volved a market allocation agreement between the operator of a
shopping center and two women's apparel stores doing business in the
center. The agreement was in the form of lease provisions granting
one of the stores an exclusive right to sell a specified price line of
women's apparel and prohibiting the other store from selling within
that price line. The court, through a consent judgment, found that the
agreement constituted a combination to create and carry out restric-
tions in trade or commerce in violation of the Valentine Act, and was
thus void."
C. Tying Arrangements
The United States Supreme Court has defined a tying arrange-
ment as "an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on
the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) prod-
uct, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any
other supplier."67 Tying arrangements violate both the specific pro-
372 U.S. 253 (1963), and have applied a rule of reason test. See 8 J. VoN KALINOWSKI, supra
note 23, § 62.04. However, in United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596,609 (1972),
the Supreme Court made clear that it favors the per se approach to the courts' "limited utility
in examining difficult economic problems." See 8 J. VoN KALINOWSKI, supra note 23, § 62.02
(1976).
" 388 U.S. at 381.
" United States v. Scaly, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967). See also United States v. Topco
Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
' OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.01(B)(1) (Page 1962).
'2 Id. § 1331.01(B)(3).
- Id. § 1331.02.
" Comment, The Valentine Act, 15 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 179, 192 (1963).
' 139 Ohio Misc. 155 (C.P. Cuyahoga Cty. 1973).
" Id. at 161.
97 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
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visions of section 3 of the Clayton Act,8 and the broad standards of
section 1 of the Sherman Act."9 Historic distinctions in the standards
of illegality applied under the two statutes have been nearly elimi-
nated.70
Tying arrangements under the federal laws have repeatedly been
held to be illegal per se if the plaintiff can establish that the sale or
lease" of any product is conditioned on the purchase of a different
product, that defendant has sufficient economic power with respect
to the tying product appreciably to restrain free competition for sale
of the tied product, and that a "not insubstantial" amount of inter-
state commerce is involved.72 These standards for establishing a per
se violation have been much relaxed in recent years and a tie-in may
be held to violate the Sherman Act even without such a showing,
under a rule of reason analysis.7 3
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "tying
agreements serve little purpose beyond the suppression of competi-
tion,' 74 and thus "fare harshly under the laws forbidding restraints
of trade."75 Continuing their consistent use of federal antitrust law
decisions as persuasive precedent, 6 Ohio courts therefore can also be
expected to treat tying arrangements harshly in applying the Valen-
tine Act prohibitions. 7
An indication of the Ohio court's treatment of alleged tying
arrangements may be forthcoming. An action under the Valentine
Act which charges the owners and operators of a mobile home park
and sales operation in Ohio with instituting an illegal tying arrange-
ment is now pending.7" The defendants in that case are alleged to have
used their market power over a unique commodity, land, to force
current and prospective tenants of their park to purchase new mobile
home vehicles from them alone.
15 U.S.C. § 14 (Supp. IV, 1974) applies only to a sale or lease of "goods, wares,
merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities."
69 Id. § I.
11 See Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969). For a
detailed discussion of the issue, see 2 M. HANDLER, TWENTY-FVE YEARS OF ANTITRUST 793
(1973).
71 See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
12 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 11 (1958).
1 Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 500 (1969).
1, Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949).
71 Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 606 (1953); Northern
Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
76 See text accompanying notes 33-47 supra.
n OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1331.01(B)(1), (B)(3) (Page 1962).
78 State ex reL Brown v. NAPCO, Civil No. 74-0360 (C.P. Lake Cty., filed June 6, 1974).
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D. Boycotts and Refusals to Deal
"[A] combination by two or more persons for the purpose of
boycotting a third person is. . .a violation of [the Valentine] Act."79
Agreements between parties at different levels of a distribution chain
(vertical refusals to deal) and agreements between parties or competi-
tors at the same level of a distribution chain (group boycotts or
horizontal refusals to deal) are generally considered to be per se
violations of the federal and Ohio antitrust laws if there is an express
agreement between two or more parties."'
However, "a truly unilateral refusal to deal does not violate
[section 1 of the Sherman Act] since it involves a single person acting
alone. Nevertheless, the courts have sometimes been able to interpret
a unilateral refusal to deal to constitute unlawful collaborative con-
duct."81
A group of dentists was recently sued under the Valentine Act
using a boycott theory. It was alleged that the group had combined
to create and carry out a conspiracy to boycott the Ohio Department
of Public Welfare by refusing to treat welfare patients.8 2 With the
erosion of the doctrine in United States v. Colgate & Co.,13 it should
be easier to find illegal refusals to deal under the antitrust laws, and
future litigation under this theory is likely.
E. Other Violations
Additional antitrust violations that are less often the subject of
state enforcement actions84 are not discussed herein. These violations
include merger,85 monopolization, 86 attempts to monopolize,87 and
exclusive dealing arrangements. 81
"' State v. Jacobs, 10 Ohio Dec. 252, 254 (Police Ct. 1900). See also Hellman v. Retail
Furniture Salesmen's Ass'n, 23 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 177 (Super. Ct. 1919); State ex rel. Cullitan
v. Greater Cleveland Livery Owners Ass'n, 35 Ohio Op. 68, 74 N.E.2d 104 (C.P. Cuyahoga
Cty. 1947).
I I J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 23, § 76.01.
" 8 id. § 61.02.
State ex rel. Brown v. Alliance Dental Soc'y, Civil No. 76-96 (C.P. Stark Cty., April
23, 1976) (consent judgment).
'a 250 U.S. 300 (1919). See note 130 infra. The doctrine provided that a manufacturer
could individually refuse to deal with parties not selling at a suggested price.
" See 2 J. VoN KALINOWSKI, supra note 23, chs. 15-17.
Id. ch. 17.
Id. ch. 9.
97 Id.
I- ld. ch. 12.
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III. REMEDIES AVAILABLE UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS
Any party injured in its "business or property" may bring a civil
action under the Ohio and the federal antitrust laws."9 Double
damages may be recovered under the Ohio laws and treble damages
under the federal laws.90 Public bodies such as the State of Ohio and
its political subdivisions, as well as private entities, may recover dam-
ages as injured parties. 1 Private plaintiffs may seek injunctive relief
in addition to a damage recovery.2 Civil forfeitures for Valentine Act
violations may be recovered through prosecution by the attorney
general or a prosecuting attorney of any county where the defendant
resides or does business.9"
The attorney general and the prosecuting attorney of the appro-
priate county are also granted the authority to criminally prosecute
for violations of the Valentine Act. These criminal violations are
punishable by fines, imprisonment, or both. 4 State and local govern-
mental authorities have no power to enforce the federal antitrust laws
through criminal prosecutions.
IV. CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT
A. History of Criminal Enforcement of the Valentine Act
Even though the Valentine Act has provided criminal penalties"
" OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.08 (Page 1962); 15 U.S.C. § 15 (Supp. IV, 1974).
90 Id. Whether an action is brought under the federal or state antitrust laws depends mainly
on the existence of interstate commerce, as required under the Sherman or Clayton Acts. 15
U.S.C. §§ 1, 12 (Supp. IV, 1974).
' A political subdivision may bring its own actions just like any other injured party by
using its own legal counsel. It may also, by agreement, be represented by the Attorney General.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.81 (Page 1969). Another alternative is to join in a class action of
injured parties as provided for by OHIo R. Civ. P. 23 and FED. R. Civ. P. 23. In the interest
of judicial economy, the state attorney general is considered to be the best representative of a
class of political entities. State v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 436,440 (N.D.
Il. 1972). See generally I J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, pt. 2, 1 1.44 (2d ed. 1975).
92 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.11 (Page 1962).
93 Id. § 1331.03.
" Id. § 1331.99. See note 95 infra.
The most severe penalties are imposed for violations of §§ 1331.02 and 1331.05, which
have been made felonies of the fourth degree. Sub. H.B. 1358, 111th Ohio Gen. Ass'y (effective
Oct. I, 1976), amending OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1331.99(A) (Page 1962). Such felonies are
subject to imprisonment of from six months to five years and a fine of not more than $2,500.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.11 (Page 1975). Section 1331.05 prohibits combinations to
control the price or supply, or to prevent competition in the sale of various food products, and
specifically provides that each day's violation is a separate offense. Section 1331.02 prohibits
all forms of trusts like the infamous Standard Oil trust, and prohibits compliance with a foreign
blacklist or.boycott. Sub. H.B. 1358, amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.02 (Page 1962).
All other antitrust violations fall within the scope of § 1331.04. The all-encompassing
language of this section declares that any violation of the Valentine Act is a prohibited conspir-
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since its passage in 1898, only twelve criminal prosecutions are re-
ported, all prior to 1910.96 Prosecutions occurred in eleven different
counties" and involved a wide variety of industries." The reported
decisions that indicate the penalties imposed show that defendants
were fined as little as $50 plus costs99 and as much as $5,000 per
defendant,100 with sentences of imprisonment ranging up to one
year. 01 Price fixing and boycotts were included as prosecution tar-
gets, though most opinions did not set forth in detail the factual basis
for the charge. Since this flurry of prosecutions prior to 1910, how-
ever, criminal enforcement of antitrust principles in Ohio has been
left to the federal government.
B. Criminal Antitrust Prosecution at the Federal Level
Criminal prosecution is much heralded as the ultimate weapon
in the federal antitrust enforcement arsenal, standing as the great
deterrent to any businessman contemplating an antitrust infraction.
acy against trade and makes clear that liability attaches to participants irrespective of capacity.
Violation is a misdemeanor of the first degree, and each day's violation of § 1331.04 is a
separate offense. Sub. H.B. 1358, amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.99(B) (Page 1962).
Such offenses result in imprisonment of not more than six months and a fine of not more than
$1,000. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.21 (Page 1975).
A further criminal penalty is imposed for violations of § 1331.15, which prohibits geo-
graphic price discrimination by dealers of milk products. These violations are misdemeanors
of the second degree. Sub. H.B. 1358, amending OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.99(C) (Page
1962). The penalty for this grade of offense is up to ninety days in prison and a fine of not
more than $750. OHIO RaV. CODE ANN. § 2929.21 (Page 1975).
" State v. General Fire Extinguisher Co., 9 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 438 (C.P. Summit Cty. 1910);
Hammond v. State, 78 Ohio St. 15, 84 N.E. 416 (1908); Arnsman v. State, 11 Ohio C.C.R.
(n.s.) 113 (Cir. Ct. 1908); Lemmon v. State, 77 Ohio St. 427, 83 N.E. 608 (1908); State v.
Bovee, 6 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 337 (C.P. Lorain Cty. 1907); State v. Ice Delivery Co., 5 Ohio N.P.
(n.s.) 89 (C.P. Hamilton Cty. 1907); Hughes v. State, 9 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 369 (Cir. Ct. 1907),
affd without reported opinion, 77 Ohio St. 640 (1908); State v. Crystal Ice Co., 5 N.P. (n.s.)
149 (C.P. Franklin Cty. 1906); State v. Standard Oil Co., 51 Ohio L. Bull. 563 (P. Ct. 1906);
State ex rel. Taylor v. Ross, 4 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 377 (C.P. Ashtabula Cty. 1906); State v. Gage,
72 Ohio St. 210, 73 N.E. 1063 (1905); State v. Jacobs, 7 Ohio N.P. 261 (Police Ct. 1900).
" Allen, Ashtabula, Cuyahoga, Delaware, Erie, Franklin, Hamilton, Hancock, Lorain,
Lucas, and Summit.
" Ice (three separate prosecutions), ice cream, insurance (two separate prosecutions), coal,
lumber, petroleum, and fire extinguishers.
" State v. Jacobs, 7 Ohio N.P. 261 (Police Ct. 1900).
,0 State v. Hygeia Ice Co., 16 Ohio Dec. 735 (C.P. Lucas Cty. 1906). One half of the
sentence was later suspended by the common pleas court.
"I Lemmon v. State, 77 Ohio St. 427, 83 N.E. 608 (1908). The supreme court held that
imprisonment pursuant to the Valentine Act must not be in the workhouse.
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But while there had been 394 defendants sentenced to prison as of
1965 for violation of federal antitrust provisions," 2 and nearly two
million dollars in fines were meted out in the electrical equipment
conspiracy cases,' it is far too simplistic to assume from these
figures that the use of criminal sanctions has had the desired deterrent
effect. During the first eighty-four years of the Sherman Act, only
forty-one individuals were actually incarcerated for antitrust viola-
tions not associated with labor or violence." 4 While the fines in the
electrical equipment cases totaled nearly two million dollars, the
value of the goods involved exceeded one billion dollars."0 5 Thus the
extent to which criminal sanctions for violation of the antitrust laws
were viewed as genuine and therefore conduct-shaping threats to
American businessmen is subject to much debate. What does seem
clear, however, is that the days of paper sanctions are drawing to a
close.
In 1974 Congress acted to "remedy one of the most glaring
inequities in our entire criminal justice system."' 0 It made a conspir-
acy restraining trade in violation of the Sherman Act a felony, pun-
ishable by imprisonment of up to three years and maximum fines of
one million dollars for a corporation and one hundred thousand
dollars for an individual.0 7 This unmistakable expression of Congres-
sional intent would mean little without a commitment to criminal
prosecution by the Justice Department and a resolve by the judiciary
101 Wright, Jail Sentences in Antitrust Cases, 37 F.R.D. 183 (1965).
113 Flynn, Criminal Sanctions under State and Federal Antitrust Laws, 45 TEXAS L. REv.
1301, 1308 n.45 (1967).
0I Address by Assistant Attorney General Thomas E. Kauper, Pittsburgh Antitrust Insti-
tute, November 19, 1974.
Ios Flynn, supra note 103, at 1308 n.45. The fines imposed against General Electric or
$437,500, for example, represented less than 0.1% of the company's total income and slightly
more than 0.2% of its net profit in 1960. Testimony of former Assistant Attorney General Lee
Loevinger, Hearings on Legislation to Strengthen Penalties Under the Antitrust Laws Before
the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., Ist
Sess., pt. I, at 12 (1961). Troubled by the fact that corporations had come to view antitrust
penalties as merely minor costs of doing business, Loevinger stated:
It is hardly surprising then that some business concerns apparently consider antitrust
violations simply a business risk, with corporate profits to be reaped from illegal
conduct far outweighing the slight financial burden of the fines which may be im-
posed if their conduct is discovered. Raising the maximum fines so that their imposi-
tion may have a discernible effect on the offender's balance sheet might make those
responsible for a company's affairs more careful in their direction of corporate
policies.
The largest fine levied against an individual defendant was $12,500. Flynn, supra note 103,
at 1308 n.45. This is not an overwhelming burden for a corporate executive, even if such a sum
is not reimbursed by his employer.
Im BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. RaP. No. 685, A-3 (Oct. 22, 1974). Senator Gaylord
Nelson indicated that an individual convicted of unauthorized "joyriding" could receive a more
severe penalty than a corporate executive who conspired to violate the antitrust laws.
107 The Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. § 3 (Supp. V, 1975).
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
to use the sanctions provided; but it appears that all three now share
a common viewpoint and are acting to transform little used principles
into significant determinants of business conduct. Of the forty-one
individuals incarcerated for antitrust violations between 1890 and
1974, twenty-two were jailed since 1970.108 Many courts have now
come to view price fixers as criminals and to recognize that "what is
at stake . . . is the survival of. . .the free enterprise system."'' 0
At the same time the Justice Department seems to be acting on
its declared policy of increased criminal prosecutions.Y0 Between fis-
cal 1972 and 1974 the number of criminal cases brought by the De-
partment more than doubled, from fifteen to thirty-three, and the
number of individuals indicted climbed even more dramatically, from
twenty-four to eighty-four."1 Assistant Attorney General Kauper
expressed his views that "[h]ard-core price-fixing is nothing more nor
less than stealing from a large number of people simultaneously. I
do not understand why a person who steals from millions should
receive a significantly lesser penalty than a person who steals from
one.""
12
C. Future Criminal Enforcement in Ohio
Increased federal criminal prosecutions and more severe poten-
tial and actual penalties for violation of the federal antitrust laws,
combined with the upsurge in civil enforcement of Ohio's antitrust
laws,"' lead to the expectation of renewed use of the criminal sanc-
tions of the Valentine Act. It may therefore be most useful to explore
the factors which have determined federal antitrust criminal priorities
in the past.
The Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Anti-
trust Laws explained that the "criminal process should be used only
where the law is clear and the facts reveal a flagrant offense and plain
intent unreasonably to restrain trade."'1 4 The Antitrust Division of
the Justice Department similarly maintains that:
"' Kauper, supra note 104.
IN Judge Ganey imposing sentence in the Electrical Equipment Cases, quoted in Note,
Antitrust Criminal Sanctions, 3 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 146, 147 (1967). See also Interview
with Judge Charles B. Renfrew, BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 689, AA-1, AA-7
(Nov. 19, 1974).
"' See Address by Deputy Assistant Attorney General Keith I. Clearwaters before the
Antitrust Law Section, New York State Bar Association, January 22, 1975.
Id.
11 Kauper, supra note 104.
13 See text accompanying notes 1-11, 102-112 supra.
"' REPORT OF THE ATrORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS 349 (1955).
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[viagueness in the legal definitions of the prohibited acts might raise
problems of fairness, or even constitutionality in proceeding crimi-
nally. . . . The solution. . . has been to lay down a firm rule that
criminal prosecutions will be recommended. . . only against willful
violations of the law, and that one or two conditions must appear
to be shown to establish willfulness. First, if the rules of law alleged
to have been violated are clear and established-describing per se
offenses-willfulness will be presumed. . . . Second, if the acts of
the defendants show intentional violations-if through circumstan-
tial evidence or direct testimony it appears that the defendants knew
they were violating the law or were acting with flagrant disregard
for the legality of their conduct-willfulness will be presumed."'
The need for complementary state antitrust enforcement agencies is
by now widely accepted,' and the standards developed by the federal
enforcement system can be readily adopted by Ohio in its determina-
tion of whom to prosecute.
V. PROJECTIONS OF FUTURE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES
In addition to actions enforcing the state and federal antitrust
laws in the traditional areas of abuse as previously described, a num-
ber of areas exist for future enforcement in Ohio.
A. After Goldfarb
The Supreme Court in its decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar,' 7 held that fee schedules imposed by state and local bar associa-
tions violate the antitrust laws. The Goldfarb decision specifically
115 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN ASSESSMENT 109 (1967). Based upon such
considerations, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division in 1955
described the types of offenses generally prosecuted criminally: "(I) price-fixing; (2) other
violations of the Sherman Act where there is proof of a specific intent to restrain trade or to
monopolize; (3) a less easily defined category of cases which might generally be described as
involving proving use of predatory practices (boycotts, for example) to accomplish the objective
of the combination or conspiracy; (4) the fact that a defendant has previously been convicted
of or adjudged to have been, violating the antitrust laws may warrant indictment for a second
offense." REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS 350 (1955). See also A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. 401-403
(1970).
"I See Swope, supra note 53. See also NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION
ON ANTITRUST LAW, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE NEW YORK ANTI-
TRUST LAWS 632 (1957); Note, The Commerce Clause and State Antitrust Regulation. 61
COLUM. L. REV. 1472 (1961).
17 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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noted that "learned professions" are not exempt from the antitrust
laws,"' and thereby set the stage for attack on a number of restrictive
activities carried out by the learned professions."'
Although Goldfarb has eliminated any -across-the-board
exemption for these professions, the decision was not meant to make
all activities which are per se violations in other contexts illegal in a
professional context. 20 If a particular restriction relates to commer-
cial rather than professional aspects, however, it is more likely to be
held illegal.12' Thus, for example, any restriction relating to price
competition is inherently suspect, as it is in a nonprofessional context.
Other requirements of a profession, however, such as graduation
from an accredited school, may be reasonable because of the import-
ance of having qualified practitioners. Even these requirements are
questionable, however, if it appears that they are intended to control
the number of members in the profession rather than to maintain the
quality of the profession. When less restrictive means exist for carry-
ing out the purpose of a profession's rule or regulation, the more
restrictive rules are open to attack. Even before the Goldfarb
decision, the Ohio Attorney General's Office122 and the federal en-
forcement agencies'2 were instituting antitrust actions involving the
professions.
"I Id. at 787.
"' See Rigler, Professional Codes of Conduct After Goldfarb: A Proposed Method of
Antitrust Analysis, 29 ARK. L. REV. 185 (1975).
2 421 U.S. at 787 n.17.
2 Id. at 787-88.
" In State ex rel. Brown v. Cleveland Bd. of Realtors, Civil No. 75-941583 (C.P. Cuyah-
oga Cty., Oct. 2, 1975), the State of Ohio attacked education restrictions on persons entering
the realty profession. A consent decree was entered. A consent judgment was also entered in
State ex rel. Brown v. Architects Soe'y, Civil No. 74CV-04-1693 (C.P. Franklin Cty., April
25, 1975). The judgment required that both members of the society and current and potential
customers of architectural services be informed that fee schedules were not valid and that price
could be a factor in competitive bidding. Still pending is State ex rel. Brown v. State Bd. of
Registration for Prof. Eng'rs & Surveyors, Civil No. 75CV-01-302 (C.P. Franklin Cty., filed
Jan. 22, 1975) in which the State of Ohio has alleged that the engineering board has gone
beyond its authority in adopting a rule prohibiting competitive bidding by engineers and
surveyors. In State v. Ohio Medical Indemnity, Inc., Civil No. 76096 (S.D. Ohio, filed July 9,
1975) (still pending) price fixing, monopolization and illegal vertical joint ventures in the
provision of physician services and medical insurance are alleged. See also State ex rel. Brown
v. Alliance Dental Soc'y, Civil No. 79-96 (C .P. Stark Cty., April 23, 1976).
213 A small sampling of the federal activities is here presented. A consent decree barring
a trade association from prohibiting competitive bidding by means of its conduct standards was
entered in United States v. American Inst. of Architects, 1972 Trade Cas. 73,981 (D.D.C.
1972), as modified by exchange of correspondence, 1972 Trade Cas. 74,074 (D.D.C. 1972). In
United States v. National Soe'y of Prof. Eng'rs, Civil No. 2412-12 (D.D.C., filed Dec. 5, 1972)
it was alleged that the ban on competitive bidding by the National Society of Professional
Engineers constituted price fixing. The district court has re-entered a judgment requiring the
Society to amend its Code of Ethics to eliminate prohibitions on competitive bidding following
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The Court in Goldfarb also held that the defendants' activities
were not sheltered from antitrust attack by the state action exemption
under the doctrine of Parker v. Brown,' since the state had not
become so active in the initiation and regulation of activities of the
bar association to indicate an intent to preclude competition. While
it remains to be seen how much involvement is necessary before a
state can be said to be compelling certain activities, it would appear
certain that the state must at least have approved of the activities of
its agency.2 5 The degree of inquiry necessary to warrant a conclu-
sion of approval is a question that remains open, and an issue which
will undoubtedly be the subject of litigation in future cases involving
activities by legislatively-created agencies.
B. Government Regulation of Industries
Few aspects of our economy are not regulated, directly or in-
directly, by an agency, commission, board or committee. Although
regulation is intended to be for the public welfare, regulatory
schemes often produce anticompetitive results. In some instances
there has been a considered determination that competition is not in
the public interest when weighed against other factors.2 In many
other cases, however, regulation may have anticompetitive effects
only because the regulatory scheme was instituted without full consid-
eration of the impact on the marketplace.
Occupational regulation is a prime area for closer examina-
remand by the Supreme Court to consider the case in light of Goldfarb. Final judgment has
been stayed pending disposition on appeal. The Department of Justice has investigated the
pharmacy profession for possible antitrust violations involving restrictions on advertising im-
posed by the American Pharmaceutical Association Code of Ethics. See Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizen's Consumer Council, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976); American
Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Justice, 467 F.2d 1290 (6th Cir. 1972). In
United States v. Alameda County Vet. Med. Ass'n, Civil No. 75-1076-N (S.D. Cal. filed Nov.
14, 1975) (still pending), the complaint alleges price fixing in providing veterinary services
through fee schedules and other mechanisms. The Federal Trade Commission has announced
plans to investigate restrictions on advertising in the medical profession (F.T.C. News
Summary, December 26, 1975), and real estate brokerage industry restrictions on a number of
activities (F.T.C. News Summary, January 2, 1976).
412 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
115 Id. at 352. One very recent Supreme Court case held that even such approval will not
suffice in some cases. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 2110 (1976). The mere existence
of state participation or acts of public officials will not itself create immunity from the antitrust
laws. Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1047 (1972); Woods Explor. & Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286, 1294
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock
Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 30 (Ist Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
121 For example, certain aspects of the public utilities industries have been specifically
exempted from the antitrust laws. See, e.g., OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4931.19 (Page 1954).
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tion. 127 Most regulation of occupations involves the creation of a
board,12" with the authority to license the practice of the occupation
and to promulgate regulations in accord with the statute. The vague
parameters of this authority cause much anticompetitive regulation.
In view of the benefits to be derived from competition, legislators and
regulators should expect closer scrutiny of statutes and agency imple-
mented rules that have an anticompetitive impact, especially when
there is no overriding benefit to 'be gained by eliminating competition
from an industry.
C. After Repeal of the Fair Trade Laws
Price fixing is a per se violation of the antitrust laws.' Resale
price maintenance, whereby parties at one level of the distribution
chain determine the minimum prices to be set at some lower level of
the distribution chain, is one such price-fixing mechanism which is
generally considered illegal under the antitrust laws. 130 Until very
recently, however, certain resale price maintenance arrangements
were exempted from the antitrust laws because of the Miller-Tydings
Act, 131 the McGuire Act,'32 and the state fair trade laws.'33 Fair
trade laws permitted suppliers of brand name or trademarked goods,
sold in "free and open" competition with goods of the same general
type, to prohibit buyers (usually retailers) from reselling at a price
below a set minimum level. 34 The Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts
121 Over 50 occupations are regulated in Ohio. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. tit. 47 (Page 1954).
as amended, (Page Supp. 1975); § 3301.07(D) (Page 1972); § 3375.47 (Page 1972); § 3905.01
(Page 1971); §§ 4151.14-.24 and 4151.29-.35 (Page 1973)
' The boards are generally made up of members of the occupation, which in itself can
create anticompetitive problems. For example, a member of an occupation has a vested
economic interest in restricting the number of new entrants into the occupation. If the regula-
tions are mandated by legislation, however, there is the problem of the state action exemption
under the Parker doctrine.
' United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 370 U.S. 150 (1940).
23, United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 47 (1960); United States v. Bausch
& Lomb Optical Co., 45 F. Supp. 387 (S.D. N.Y. 1942), affd, 321 U.S. 707. 724 (1944): FTC
v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 453 (1922). Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park
& Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911). As provided under United States v. Colgate & Co.. 250 U.S.
300 (1919), manufacturers can individually refuse to deal with parties not selling at a suggested
price. This doctrine, commonly known as the "Colgate Doctrine," has been seriously eroded.
See Parke. Davis, Bausch & Lomb, and Beech-Nut, supra.
'1' 15 U.S.C. § I (Supp. IV, 1974), amending § I of the Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat.
209 (1890).
132 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970), anending § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 745.
66 Stat. 631 (1952).
M= Ohio's fair trade laws are found at OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1333.05-10 & 1333.27-
.34 (Page 1962).
"I See 7 J. voN KALINOWSKI, supra note 23, § 52.011 [1]; 9 id. § 67.0212l[d].
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exempted this type of resale price maintenance from the federal anti-
trust laws if state law authorized the exemption. 3 1
Ohio's fair trade laws were repealed effective December 30,
1975,136 and Congress has since repealed the federal antitrust exemp-
tions which made the fair trade laws immune from attack. 37 Because
of the repeal of the fair trade laws, distributors attempting to impose
resale prices on others in the chain of distribution should anticipate
that their actions will be considered illegal price fixing under the
antitrust laws. Boycotts of and refusals to deal with retailers because
they do not sell at suggested prices are no longer legal means of resale
price maintenance. Even where actual express or implied agreements
do not exist, illegal price fixing can be found when enforcement sys-
tems, including blacklists and licenses, are used to force distributors
to sell at fixed prices.' Threats to discontinue sales to retailers who
do not sell at set prices and subsequent reinstatement of a sales
relationship with retailers who provide assurance of their intent to sell
at the set prices can also be a violation of the antitrust laws.,3
Before repeal of the fair trade laws, a number of items were "fair
traded," including stereos, televisions, appliances, mattresses, jew-
elry, prescription drugs, tools, bicycles, and hosiery. Any appearance
of parallel pricing of these or other items may be considered highly
suspect, and raise the question of an illegal scheme to maintain resale
prices.
D. Parens Patriae Actions
In 1972 the United States Supreme Court held that a state may
not recover damages for injury to its general economy under the
antitrust laws.4 0 In 1973 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dis-
missed California's attempt to sue in a representative capacity for
damages suffered by individual consumers of snack foods subject to
a price-fixing conspiracy, despite the contention that denial of the
state's authority effectively foreclosed any recovery of the illegal
" Id. § 52.01[2]. The federal laws do not allow resale price maintenance arrangements
between competitors. Id. § 62.02[2][a]. For a general discussion of the purpose of the fair trade
exemption, see Comment, Fair Trade: The Ideal and Reality, 27 OHIo ST. L.J. 144 (1966).
"' H.B. 324 repealed OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1333.05-.10 and 1333.27-.34 (Page 1962).
See generally 4 TRADE REG. REP. 33,820, 38,805 (1976).
'3 Act of Dec. 12, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (effective March 11, 1976).
" United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944); FTC v. Beech-
Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
"I United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). See generally Seplaki. The
Legonomics of Vertical Restrictive Conduct in Antitrust: Unfair Trading By Resale Price
Maintenance, 21 LOYOLA L. REv. 671, 676-80 (1975).
"I Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
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overcharges incurred by many consumers. " ' Despite large aggre-
gate amounts of damage, when everyday consumer purchases are
involved (e.g., potato chips, milk, bread, gasoline), individual damage
claims are so small and proof of purchases and damages so difficult
that anti-trust damage actions, even class actions, do not provide
practical relief. In response to such court rulings, Congress has en-
acted legislation to enable states to bring suit as parens patriae to
recover damages for injuries to their citizens.14 2
This new parens patriae standing will permit state attorneys
general to recover treble damages for injuries caused to natural per-
sons (other than business entities) residing within their states as a
result of a Sherman Act violation. In price-fixing cases, damages may
be proved in the aggregate by statistical or sampling methods, by the
computation of illegal overcharges, or by other reasonable means,
without the necessity of proving the individual damages or claims of
the persons on whose behalf the suit is brought. Despite many amend-
ments prior to passage, this Act promises substantial benefits to
consumers both in the recovery of ill-gotten gains and by increased
deterrent effect. 43
VI. CONCLUSION
The Antitrust Section of the Ohio Attorney General's Office has
an enforcement capability which provides comprehensive means for
dealing with restraints of trade. This state effort, along with the
antitrust programs of the United States Department of Justice and
the Federal Trade Commission, is essential to the attainment of the
socially desirable and economically sound objective of the antitrust
laws-the preservation of free and fair competition.
Yet the state and federal governments' antitrust enforcement
efforts alone cannot achieve this objective. In order to preserve a
competitive marketplace, it is essential that members of the private
bar and the business community be aware of the antitrust laws and
recognize that enforcement of these laws allows consumers at every
level of the distribution chain to obtain the best products and services
"I California v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908
(1973). For a discussion of parens patriae see Malna & Belchman, Parens Patriae Suits Jor
Treble Damages Under the Antitrust Laws, 65 Nw. U. L. REV. 193 (1970); Comment, State
Protection of its Economy and Environment: Parens Patriae Suits for Damages. 6 Co.uM.
J.L. & Soc. PROB. 411 (1970); Comment, Wrongs Without Remedy: The Concept of Parens
Patriae Suits for Treble Damages Under the Antitrust Laws, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 570 (1970).
12 The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435,
§ 301 (September 30, 1976).
In For review of the tortuous journey through Congress of parens patriae legislation, see
(BNA) ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 781, A-I to A-2, D-1 to D-22 (Sept. 21, 1976).
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at competitive prices, enables businessmen to compete without being
subjected to predatory conduct, and allows potential competitors to
enter markets without interference from illegal restraints of trade.
Through observance of the antitrust laws by the business community
and the combined enforcement efforts of government agencies and
the private bar, we can encourage and protect competition and pre-
serve the free enterprise system.
